

# Quantification of initiating events probability based on fragility functions and Bayesian network applied for multi-hazard

Aleksej Kaszko, Karol Kowal, Sławomir Potemski



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1. Introduction
2. Fragility Functions
3. Bayesian Network
4. Integration of Fragility Functions and Bayesian Network
5. Example of integrated method
6. Advantages of integrated method

# Introduction

IAEA in „Defining initiating events for purposes of probabilistic safety assessment” describe seven methods for evaluation of IE:

- a) Engineering Evaluation or technical study of plant
- b) Reference to previous PRAs
- c) EPRI list of IEs
- d) Logical classification
- e) Plant energy balance fault tree
- f) Analysis of operating experience for actual plant
- g) Failure mode and effect analysis
- h) Other methods

Currently after Fukushima accident one of the major concern for the PSA is to evaluate multi-hazards and initiating events that are caused by multi-hazards.

Multi-hazard in PSA is considering more than one hazard in a given place/facility and their interrelations such as correlation, time dependence or cumulative occurrence and potential interactions.

# Introduction

An initiating event is an incident that requires an automatic or operator initiated action to bring the plant into a safe and steady-state condition, where in the absence of such action the core damage states of concern can result in severe core damage. Initiating events are usually categorized in divisions of internal and external initiators reflecting the origin of the events [1]

Initiating Events are divided into two groups:

- Internal
  1. Fires
  2. Internal Floods
  3. Turbine Missiles
  4. etc.
- External
  1. Forest Fires
  2. External Floods, high level waters
  3. Seismic Events
  4. Extreme Winds
  5. Airplane crash



# External Natural Hazards /Initiating Events

## 1. Seismotectonic hazards

- Vibratory ground motion
- Vibratory ground motion induced or triggered by human activity
- Surface faulting
- Liquefaction, lateral spreading
- Dynamic compaction
- Permanent ground displacement subsequent to earthquake

## 2. Flooding and hydrological hazards

- Tsunami
- Flash flood
- Floods resulting from snow melt
- High groundwater
- Flooding due to obstruction of a river channel
- Floods resulting from changes in a river channel
- Floods resulting from large waves in inland waters
- Flood and waves caused by failure of water control structures and watercourse containment
- Seiche
- Bore
- Seawater level
- Wind generated waves

- Corrosion from salt water
- Instability of the coastal area due to erosion by strong water currents or sedimentation
- Underwater debris

## 3. Meteorological events:

### a) Extreme values of meteorological phenomena

- Precipitation, snow pack
- Extremes of air temperature
- Extremes of ground temperature
- Extremes of cooling water
- Humidity, extreme atmospheric moisture
- Extremes of air pressure
- Extreme drought
- Low ground water
- Low seawater level
- Icing, freezing fog
- White frost, hard rime, soft rime
- Hail
- Permafrost
- Recurring soil frost

# External Natural Hazards /Initiating Events cont.

## b) Rare meteorological phenomena

- Lightning
- High wind, storm
- Tornado
- Watersprout
- Blizzard, snowstorm
- Sandstorm, dust storm
- Salt spray, salt storm
- Wind-blown debris
- Snow avalanche
- Surface ice on river, lake or sea
- Frazil ice
- Ice barriers
- Mist, fog
- Solar flares, solar storms, geomagnetic storms

## 4. Biological hazards / Infestation

- Marine/river/lake growth, biological fouling
- Crustacean or mollusc growth, biological fouling
- Fish, jellyfish
- Airborne swarms
- Infestation by rodents and other animals
- Biological flotsam
- Microbiological corrosion

## 5. Geological hazards

- Subaral slope instability
- Undervater landslide, gravity flow
- Debris flow, mud flow
- Ground settlement
- Ground heave
- Karst, leeching of soluble rocks
- Sinkholes
- Unstable soils
- Volcanic hazards: near volcanic centre
- Volcanic hazards: effect extending to areas remote from volcanic centre
- Methane seep
- Natural radiation
- Meteorite fall

## 6. Forest Fire

- Forest fire, wildfire, burning turf or peat



# Earthquake Fragility Function

**Fragility function** is a probability distribution that is used to indicate the probability that a component, element or system will be damaged to a given or more severe damage expressed in the form of function of parameter

$$F_i(D) = \Phi \left( \frac{\ln(D/\theta_i)}{\beta_i} \right)$$

Where:

$F_i(D)$  - conditional probability that the component will be damaged to damage state “i” or a more severe damage state as a function of demand parameter, D

$\Phi$  - standard normal (Gaussian) cumulative distribution function

$\theta_i$  - median value of the distribution

$\beta_i$  - logarithmic standard deviation

Median  $\theta$  and logarithmic standard deviation can be obtained with one of six ways:

- A. Actual Failure Excitation
- B. Bounding Failure Excitation
- C. Capable Data
- D. Derivation (analysis)
- E. Expert opinion
- F. Updating

# Tsunami Fragility Function

$$P(x) = \Phi\left(\frac{x - \mu}{\sigma}\right)$$

or

$$P(x) = \Phi\left(\frac{\ln x - \mu'}{\sigma'}\right)$$

Where:

$P$  - cumulative probability of occurrence of the damage

$\Phi$  - standardized normal distribution function

$x$  – hydrodynamic feature of tsunami

$\mu$  - mean deviation of  $x$

$\sigma$  - standard deviation of  $x$


The values of  $\mu$  ( $\mu'$ ) and  $\sigma$  ( $\sigma'$ ) are calculated by means of least-square fitting of  $x$  ( $\ln x$ ) and the inverse of  $\Phi$ , ( $\Phi^{-1}$ ) on normal paper given by

$$x = \sigma\Phi^{-1} + \mu$$

$$\ln x = \sigma'\Phi^{-1} + \mu'$$



# Calculation methods for reliability data




# Bayesian Network

The Bayesian statistical approach facilitates the usual case in which part of the needed information is a priori available in measured data and functional relations or as expert knowledge, and part is uncertain and unknown. The unknown part can be updated a posteriori and the uncertainty reduced by later experience applying the basic laws (product and sum rule) of probability theory.


$$P(H|E) = \frac{P(E|H)P(H)}{P(E)}$$

Bayesian network (Bayesian Belief Network) is a type of probabilistic graphical model that uses Bayesian inference for probability computations. Bayesian network is aiming at modelling conditional dependence, and therefore causation, by representing conditional dependence by edges in a directed graph.





# Bayesian Network



Bayesian network representation of most cases of natural hazards and their correlations based on information from ASAMPSA\_E project



# Probabilistic Safety Assessment


PSA is systematic risk based analytical method that consists of Fault trees (systems) and Event trees - pathways that could lead to success or failure (Core Damage). PSA is mostly used to calculate probability of hypothetical scenarios that could lead to severe core damage.

The results of PSA can show weaknesses and strengths of plant's safety, and helps in identification of most sensitive parts (for example systems, elements) with highest contribution to accident scenario. With identification operator or designers of a new facility can therefore improve safety by usage of redundancy or by replacement of elements for more reliable ones.

PSA consists of three levels and currently is used all over the world.



# Probabilistic Safety Assessment



Levels of PSA [5]

# Fault Tree / Event Tree Technique



The fault tree is a logic diagram based on the principle of multi-causality, which traces all branches of events which could contribute to an accident or failure. Fault tree analyse the systems using Boolean logic as a combination of basic events.

Fault tree technique is used in high-hazard industries such as nuclear, chemical, aerospace etc. starting from 1962.

Usually Fault Trees are used with Event Trees (so called bow tie method) to analyze sequence of failed or functioning systems and their effect. Event Tree was originally published in WASH-1400, although first introduction to this method was in 1968.




# Fault Tree / Event Tree Technique



# Logic gates and basic events representation in SAPHIRE program

# Event Tree



# Fault Tree

# New approach to quantify initiating events

Each presented technique has its advantages and disadvantages. For example fragility functions are perfect for calculation of single hazard initiating events, bayesian networks have non linear structure and can help address multiple-hazards, FT/ET technique is well known and there is a lot of already developed models for nuclear facilities.

Combination of all these techniques into one model can help to address main issues in PSA that arised after Fukushima accident regarding multiple hazards






# New approach to quantify initiating events

Combination of three techniques:

- Fragility functions are used to evaluate impact on systems or components from considered natural or man induced hazards. Using of vector fragility function allows to take into account possible interactions.
- Bayesian network uses fragility functions and provides Initial Events probability in a more accurate way, taking into account multiple hazards, and their mutual dependencies.
- Well known and widely used from seventies of last century Event Trees and Fault Trees Techniques calculate Core Damage Frequency based on Initial Events probability received from Bayesian Network.



# Ideological scheme of new approach (Earthquake + Tsunami)



Ideological scheme of new approach that can represent similar case to Fukushima accident that happend in 2011.

This scheme can be extended to scheme similar to represented in slide 11 to adress most cases of natural hazards.



# Event Tree for LOOP scenario

Loss Of Offsite Power	Reactor Trip	1/3 PZR safety valves open - Overpressure	1/4 EDG available (no SBO situation)	RCS Seal LOCA	1 SG available for RHR (cond1) or PCD	1/4MSRT or 1/8 MSSV available in case of LOOP	2 of 4 MHSI available LOOP (no I&C)	1 of 4 MHSI available (LOOP)	Operator initiates FSCD	Fast cooldown with 2/4 EFWS and 2/4 MSRT	Manual Initiation of F&B	Primary Bleed available (LOOP)	1 of 4 LHSI trains for inj (LOOP)	IRWST cooling by 1 LHSI or 2 CHRS, cond1			
#LOOP	CRDM	PZR_03	SBO	RCS_07	SCD_11	MSRT08_L	SISM16A	SISM14A	OPE_3	FSCD02	OPE_01	PBL_02	SISL40	SIS_06	No.	Freq.	Conseq.
															1	3,59E-02	S
															2	1,79E-06	S
															3	4,79E-12	F,TP
															4	1,46E-10	F,TP
															5	1,79E-08	F,TP
															6	2,26E-08	F,TP
															7	7,68E-10	F,TP
															8	1,06E-07	S
															9	6,62E-12	F,SP
															10	9,62E-09	S
															11	9,93E-11	F,SP
															12	5,46E-12	F,SP
															13	1,26E-09	F,SP
															14	1,08E-10	F,SP
															15	2,93E-11	F,SP
															16	9,83E-06	SBO
															17	2,50E-06	F,TP
															18	3,59E-06	ATWS

Station Black Out	RCS Seal LOCA	1 SG available for RHR (cond1) or PCD	Operator initiates FSCD	Fast cooldown with 2/4 EFWS and 2/4 MSRT	ACCU: injection with 1/4	1 of 4 LHSI trains for inj (LOOP)	IRWST cooling by 1 LHSI or 2 CHRS, cond1			
#SBO	RCS_07	SCD_11	OPE_3	FSCD02	SISA01	SISL40	SIS_06	No.	Freq.	Conseq.
								1	9,83E-06	S
								2	1,25E-07	F,TP
								3	9,83E-08	S
								4	1,04E-09	F,SP
								5	5,34E-11	F,SP
								6	9,36E-13	F,SP
								7	6,92E-09	F,SP
								8	9,83E-10	F,SP

Event tree for Loss of Offsite Power for reference Nuclear Power Plant that consist of 14 Main Fault Trees. Each Fault Tree represents safety system.

# Fault Trees for LOOP scenario

Name	Basic Events	Sub Fault Trees	Probability
CRDM	1	0	1.00E-04
PZR_03	6	0	6.95E-05
SBO	13	4	2.74E-04
RCS_07	62	43	5.87E-06
SCD_11	192	97	5.34E-05
MSRT08_L	145	67	3.36E-10
SISM16A	103	54	1.91E-03
SISM14A	131	76	3.65E-04
OPE_3	1	0	1.00E-02
OPE_01	60	38	1.00E-02
PBL_02	66	30	3.39E-05
SISL40	224	110	3.17E-05
SIS_06	236	111	1.05E-06
SISA01	8	4	9.71E-06

This Table represents information regarding Fault Trees for LOOP Event Tree. As one can see creation of such fault trees is quite complex and can take a lot of time because of reliability data gathering, fault trees creation time etc.



# Advantages of new proposed model

Currently this model is purely theoretical, and soon there are plans to make some calculations and comparison with pure PSA model. But in summary:

- Combination of three well developed techniques
- No need to create everything from the scratch (will use already developed PSA models)
  - Less time consuming to build the whole model
  - Less costs to create
  - Less human resources needed
- More accurate calculation of IE for PSA models
- Can address multiple-hazards for single IE
- Biggest part of the model (PSA) is well accepted by regulatory bodies
- Can be applied for preventive actions during natural hazards – by model adjustment using current data on occurring hazards (e.g. earthquake, tsunami)

# References

- [1] IAEA-TECDOC-719 „Defining initiating events for purposes of probabilistic safety assessment”
- [2] Porter, K., 2020. *A Beginner’s Guide to Fragility, Vulnerability, and Risk*. University of Colorado Boulder, 136 pp., <https://www.sparisk.com/pubs/Porter-beginners-guide.pdf>.
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