

Impact assessement of flood damage on power grid customers

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
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Literature review

Natural hazards are a leading driver of power interruption to end-users around the world.

• Flood events may have a significant impact on power grids functionality in terms of:



Maintaining the security of power supply under emergency conditions triggered by floods is a challenging task because of the:





Research aim and objectives

In such a context, we propose a new model for the estimation of direct, indirect, and systemic damage.

The key objective of this model is to be an operational tool able to:



Flood hazard

Consider the magnitude, probability of occurence, and spatiotemporal variability



Vulnerability

Identify the
vulnerable
components of
power grids and
evaluate their
probability of failure



Cascading effects

Analyze the cascading effects of individual or multiple failure states on the transmission and distribution network




Assess the impacts of power outage on the power-dependent economic activities and infrastructures



System resilience

Evaluating the resilience of power grids to flood events, someone would wonder:






Workflow


To achieve this goal, the model combines:

- i. deterministic flood hazard scenarios developed by the HEC-RAS 2D modeling
- ii. fragility curves of power grid components for different voltage levels
- iii. a spatially distributed power flow model referring to the IEEE 14 bus system benchmark
- iv. a social model describing the various users connected to the power grid







1. T = 20 years






2. T = 50 years








More cabins have been flooded but less cabins have been failed





3. T = 100 years






4. T = 200 years









More cabins have been flooded but the same number of cabins failed



5. T = 500 years








Failure of both the transmission and distribution network



Conclusions

The impact assessment of flood damage on power grid customers evidences:

- the propagation of damage to power-dependent customers far from the flood event
- the need for real-time optimal dispatch strategies in emergency planning
- the criticality of certain substations and cabins for the security of power grid supply







Future recommendations

Next research efforts will be devoted to the:

• adoption of a probabilistic approach, by substituting deterministic hazard scenarios with spatial dependent, probabilistic ones



 sensitivity analysis of the different modeling phases to identify the components of the model on which the final damage scenario depends mostly

